Purpose: Banks’ ownership structure is not merely a reflection of shareholding composition and may be associated with managerial power, political connections, and credit-risk conditions. This study examines the relationships of CEO political connections and CEO structural power with banks’ ownership structure and evaluates the interaction of credit risk with these relationships.

Methodology: The study uses 119 bank-year observations from 14 banks listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange over the 2016–2025 period (corresponding to 1395–1403). Credit risk is measured using the ratio of non-performing loans to equity and the ratio of loan loss provisions to net interest revenue. The primary specifications are estimated using multivariate panel-data regression and Panel Generalized Least Squares. To assess the robustness of the interaction findings to model specification, hierarchical specifications that simultaneously include the constituent main effects are also considered.

Findings: CEO political connections and CEO structural power are positively and significantly associated with the ownership-structure indicator examined in this study. The interaction terms between the two credit-risk measures and these managerial characteristics are positive and statistically significant in the initial restricted specifications; however, their significance does not persist once the constituent main effects are entered simultaneously. The evidence therefore does not provide robust support for a stable moderating role of credit risk, and the interaction findings should be interpreted as specification-sensitive.

Originality/Value: By jointly examining political connections, CEO structural power, the ownership-structure dimension considered in this study, and credit risk, this research provides an integrated framework for analysing the links between governance mechanisms and banks’ risk conditions. The findings highlight the importance of considering managerial characteristics and credit-risk conditions together when interpreting ownership structure, while also showing that conclusions regarding credit-risk moderation require caution.