نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

گروه مدیریت صنعتی، دانشگاه علامه طباطبایی، تهران، ایران.

چکیده

هدف پژوهش حاضر بررسی رابطه بین کیفیت سود و انعطاف‌پذیری مالی است. هم‌چنین اثر برخی از مکانیزم‌های حاکمیت شرکتی بر این رابطه مورد آزمون تجربی قرار می‌گیرد. جهت آزمون فرضیه‌ پژوهش از رگرسیون خطی چندمتغیره استفاده شد. جامعه آماری 120 شرکت پذیرفته‌شده در بورس اوراق بهادار تهران طی سال‌های 1391-1400 بوده است (1200 مشاهده سال-شرکت). نتایج پژوهش نشان داد بین کیفیت سود و انعطاف‌پذیری مالی رابطه منفی و معناداری وجود دارد. به بیانی هرچه کیفیت سود کاهش یابد، شرکت‌ها باید برای تامین منابع مالی خود نگهداشت وجه نقد بیش‌تری داشته باشند. هم‌چنین نتایج نشان داد مکانیزم‌های حاکمیت شرکتی همانند استقلال هیات مدیره، تمرکز مالکیت و کمیته حسابرسی بر این رابطه اثر تعدیلی مثبت دارد. این نتایج نشان می‌دهد که وقتی کیفیت سود کاهش می‌یابد، شرکت‌ها کم‌تر به نگهداری نقدینگی روی می‌آورند. به‌طور خاص، شرکت‌هایی با کیفیت سود پایین، انعطاف‌پذیری مالی شرکت‌ها را کاهش می‌دهند. ازاین‌رو، شرکت‌ها برای انعطاف‌پذیری مالی بیش‌تر باید سودهای با کیفیت بالای را ارایه دهند. مطابق تئوری نمایندگی و تئوری حسابداری اثباتی، کیفیت پایین سود منبع افزایش نگرانی سهام‌داران از افزایش عدم تقارن اطلاعاتی است که ممکن است بر انعطاف‌پذیری مالی شرکت تاثیر منفی بگذارد. برعکس، کیفیت سود بالاتر، عدم تقارن اطلاعاتی را کاهش می‌دهد که منجر به انعطاف‌پذیری مالی بالاتر می‌شود. براساس نتایج می‌توان گفت حاکمیت شرکتی می‌تواند در مبارزه با بحران‌های مالی و هموارسازی عملیات تجاری موفق عمل کند.

کلیدواژه‌ها

عنوان مقاله [English]

Earnings quality and financial flexibility: the moderating role of corporate governance in Iran's capital market

نویسندگان [English]

  • Shadi Sayadmanesh
  • Zahra Sadeghi

ِDepartment of Industrial Management, Allameh Tabatabai University, Tehran, Iran.

چکیده [English]

The purpose of this research is to investigate the relationship between earnings quality and financial flexibility. Also, the effect of some corporate governance mechanisms on this relationship is experimentally tested. Multivariate linear regression was used to test the research hypothesis. The statistical population was 120 firms listed to the Tehran Stock Exchange during 2012-2021 (1200 firm-year observations). The research results showed that there is a negative and significant relationship between earnings quality and financial flexibility. In other words, as the earnings quality decreases, firms must holding more cash to provide their financial resources. Also, the results showed that corporate governance mechanisms such as the independence of the board of directors, the concentration of ownership and the audit committee have a positive moderating effect on this relationship. These results show that when earnings quality decreases, companies tend to hold cash less. Specifically, firms with low earnings quality reduce firms' financial flexibility. Hence, companies should provide high-quality earnings for greater financial flexibility. According to agency theory and positive accounting theory, the low quality of earnings is the source of increasing shareholders' concern about increasing information asymmetry that may negatively affect the firm's financial flexibility. Conversely, higher earnings quality reduces information asymmetry, which leads to higher financial flexibility. Based on the results, it can be said that corporate governance can be successful in fighting financial crises and smoothing business operations.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Earnings quality
  • Corporate governance
  • Financial flexibility
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